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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the State of Utah
I. R. S'TRINGHAM, J. S. SMITH, .J. D.
GARDNER, CENTRAL LAND C·O·MPANY, a corporation, UTAH l\10TOR
PARK, a corporation,· IVA PARKIN,
E. F. ZEYER, L. 0. HUNTER, ART
J. CARTER, FRED MUSE, IVY RAE
PITMAN~
E. A. CHAJ\fBERLIN,
FRANK B. BOiWERS, MRS. DEAN
R. DAYNES, ~IRS. HUGH. W. LAW,
KENNETH E. SMITH, GLEN C.
BILLS, ALBERT P. HOLT, LEWIS
HUl\fPHRIES, GOMER 0. TH0·1\1A·S,
UTAH CREDIT CO., a corporation,
CAPITOL CHEVROL.ET CO., a corporation, .HOME ACCEPT·ANCE CORPORATION, a corporation, and JOE
JOHNSON
.
,

'

A ppellJarnts,

vs.

SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal corporation,
-

~

Respondent. ,

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF F·AC.TS
This app·eal is taken from an order· of the Honorable
A.' H. Ellett, one of the Judges of the Third Judicia1 DisSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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trict Court of the State of Utah, sustaining respondent's
demurr:er to and dismissing appHllants' complaint as
amended and as is set forth in appellants' brief on pages
3 to 14, inclusive.
App ellants' complaint sought to restrain respondent
from enforcing an orde·r issued by the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City, respondent herein, pursuant to the provisions and authority of Section 5720
of the Revised Ordinances of ·Salt L·ake City, Utah,
1944, requiring appellants and others ·similarly situated
to remove certain street signs as described in said complaint and which S·ection 57·20 of the Revised Ordinances
of Sa'lt Lake City, Utah, 1944, is se~t forth in full on
pages· 14, 15 and 16 of appellants' brief.
1

Appellants contend that the court erred in sustaining
the demurrer to and orderirig_ the dismis;sal of their complaint for the· reason that ·S·ection 5720 of the_ Revised
Ordinances of Salt Lake ·City,- Utah, 1944, is void hecaus:e
it contains no stan·dard or rule to guide the.commissioners of S·alt Lake City or the public in the matter of
removal of signs and for the further reason that the
order given was arbitrary, capricious and yoid because
not supported hy any re·ason, logic, lawful classification
or legitimate objection and under this last re·ason appeliants ~also contend that no valid order was given to
app·ellants by respondent to remove said signs.
RESPOND·ENT''S ARGUMENT
I t is respondent's position -that appellants did not
1
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3
set forth facts sufficient to warrant the trial court in
granting the relief therein prayed for ·and that the trial
court 'vas justified in entering its order sustaining re-~
spondent 's demurrer and ordering the dismiss~al of appellants' complaint upon appellants ' failure and r•efusal
to amend their said complaint or otherwise plead in said
action.
I

·.,),

Respondent in advancing its position in the foregoing matter and in answer to appellants' brief heretofore ·filed 'vith your Honorable Court herein sets forth
its argument under siX points, e'ach of which will be
discussed s·eparately as follows :

POIN·TS ARGUED
I. THE CITY HAS SUFFICIENT PO'WER TO.
REGULATE OR PREVENT THE INSTALLATION,
MAINTENANCE OR REMOVAL o·F 'SIGNS· LOCATED IN PUB-LIC S!TREETS .
• II. THE PE-RMIT AND LICENSE GIVEN BY
THE CITY TO INSTALL AND MAINTAIN SIGNS·
'
IN ITS S'TREET·S IS AT MO:ST A TEMPORARY
PERMIT AND MAY BE REV·O·KED AT THE WILL
OF THE CITY COMMISSION.

ill. THE COURT CANNOT PASS. UPON THE
WISDOM OF THE CITY COMMISSIONERS!- IN
MAKING AND ENTERING THEIR ORDER OF
REMOVAL OF SIGNS IN THE STREETS OF SALT
LAKE CITY.
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IV. PROPER NOTICE OF THE ORDER OF
REMOVAL WAS GIVEN TO E·ACH APPELLANT.
V. THE ORDER OF REMO\TAL OF SIGNS
WAS GIVEN TO EACH HOLDER OF A 'PERMIT
OR LICENSE SIMILARLY ·SITUATED OR LO·CA'TED IN SALT LAKE CITY.
VI. -UNDER CITY'S DELEGATED POWERS
IT IS N·OT REQUIRED THAT SECTION 5720 OF
THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF :s~LT LAKE
CITY, UTAH, 19¥, CONTAIN STAND·ARDS OR
RULES TO GUIDE THE CO·MMTSSIONERS OF
S;ALT LAKE CITY OR PUBLIC IN THE MATTER
OF THE REMOVAL OF LICENSED SIGNS.
ARGUMENT
I. THE CITY HAS SUFFICIE·N·T POWER TO
REGULA·TE OR PREVENT THE INSTALLATION,
MAINTENANCE OR REM0\7 AL O·F SIGNS LOCATED IN PUBLIC STREET·S.)
It is conceded by the city that it has no greater
powers than those expre'Ss_ly granted to it by the St1ate
Legislature.
Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, 83 Utah 311,
28 P. 2d 161.
·
Salt Lake City- vs. Sutter, 61 Utah 533, 216
P. 234.
'The Utah State Legislature has se·en fit to delegate
to the cities located within the State of Utah wide general powers in the control of its s~treets. Those s·eetions
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in the State statutes whi~h will he herein8.fter specifically
referred to are set forth as follows :

'•15-8-26. SIGN·S AND ADVERTISING
:\IATTER. They may regulate or prevent the
11se of streets, sidewalks, public buildings and
grounds for signs, signposts, awning8, horse
troughs or racks, or for posting handbills or
advertisements.''
"15-8-23. CLEANI-NG P R·O P E R·T Y,
STR,EETS AND SIDEWALKS. They may regulate and control the use of.sidewalksandallstruct.ures thereunder or thereover; and they. may require the owner or occupant, or the agent of any
owner or occupant, of prop~erty to remove all
weeds and noxious vegetation from such prop- ·
erty, and in front thereof to the curb line of the
street, and to keep the sidewalks in front of such
property free from litter, snow, ice an·d obstructions-.''
'' 15-8-11. STREETS-ENCROACHMENTS,
LIGHTING, SPRINKLING, CLEANING. They
may regulate the use of streets; a'lle·ys, avenues,
sidewalks, crosswal_ks, parks and public grounds,
prevent and remove obstructions and encroachments th,ereon, and provide for the lightjng,
spri-nkling and cleaning of the s~me.' '

'' 15-8-10. TREE;S. · ·They may plant, or direct
and regulate· the planting- of, ornamental shade
trees in streets., parks and public grounds.'' _,,
.
~-

~'15-8-84.

ORDINANCES-PUNTSHMENT.
They may pass all ordinances and rules, and make
all regulations, not repugnant to 1aw, necessary
for carrying into effect or discharging all powers
and duties cohferred by, this chapter, and 'such as.
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are necessary and prop~eT to provide for the safety
and prese-rve the health, and promote the prosperity, iniprove 'the morals, peace and good order,
comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein; and may enforce obedience to such
·. ordinances with such fines or penalties as they
may deem proper; p·rovided, that the punishment
of any offense shall be by fine· in any sum less
than $300 or by imprisonment not to exceed six
months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.''

It should be noted that in Sections 15-8-26 and
15-8-11 th;e city's powers are to regulate an-d prevent
while in Sections 15-8-10. and 15-8-23, th:ey are merely
to regulate. S·ection 15-8-84 dele·gates to cities of Utah
general police powers which· permit and :empower cities
to enact ordinan<'es to provide fo-r the safety and preserve the health and promote the prosperity,. improve
the morals, peace and good o~der, comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof and
for th:e protection of prop·erly therein. This section will
be more fully referred to under the argument of points
II and VI of ifuis brief.
I

II. ··T·HE PERMIT AND LICEN'SE GIVEN BY
THE .CITY TO IN·S'T.ALL· AND MAINTAIN SIGNS
IN ITS STREET:S IS A·T MOS·T A TEMPORARY
PERMIT AND MAY BE REVOKED AT THE WILL
0'F 'rHE CITY C·OMMI SSIO·N.
1

The ca~es general1y hold that an individual can
acquire no prope:rty right in a p~ublic street and that
any p-rivate use of ·a p·ubli!c s·tre:et eith:er by a permit,
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adverse use, or oth,erwise, and for no 1n-atter how long
a period of tune, is n1erely a pernris.sive right and can
be terminated and prevented at the· wi~ of the governing body. The power for such a.ction is VJested in such
governing body by either a direct grant of power or by
the police power as is vested in then1
.
I
The case of Palace Garage, et. al., vs .. Oklahoma
City, an Oklahoma case report,ed in 268 Pac. at p·age
240, is a leading case frequently cited to sustain the
city's right under its police powers to ·enforce an ordinance requiring the removal of obstructions from a
public street. The matter was an appeal from the trial
court-'s order sustaining a demurrer to appellant's petition, wherein it was reques.ted that ·the city be enjoined
from enforcing an ordinance requiring th'e removal of
service stations located between the sidewalk and the
curb. The ·State law in Oklahoma granted to cities the
power to prohibit and prevent an encroachment into and
upon the s~dewalk!s and streets. Ap·pellant contende·d it
had certain rights in the parking which was admitted,
but the court held that the passag.e of the ordinance
requiring the removal was a valid exercise of the police .
power of the city and stated as follow~ :
din exercising the power conferred upon it.
under the general welfare clause of the statute,
the city council has broad discretion to Qetermine
what is necessary for the public welfare, .safety,
comfort, and convenience of the inhabitants of the
city. The city council iikewise has a sim]lar discretion in determining what characte-r of structul!e may be. ·erected and maintained upon, over,
or under the streets, alleys, and sidewalks of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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city, so iong as such structure does not constitute
per se a common nuisance. 'A .purpresture is an
encroachment upon the· street, which the municipality may or may not tolerate at its option, if
the same be not als·o a, public nuisance.' Ruffner
v. Phelps, 65 Ark. 412, 46 S. W. 728; Owens &
Scott v. Town of Atkins (163 Ark. 82), 259 S. W.
39'6 ( 34 A.L.R. 267) . Under the allegatipns of the
ap·pellants' complaint, their filling. station, while
a perpresture, was not a pub1ic nuisance per se,
because they alleged that it was C()·nstructed with
all safeguards and prote·ction against· fire, and
so as not to c:reate any hazard or risk from that
source, and likewise that its appliances do not
extend into the street, but are located betWeen
the sidewalk and curb line of the street, and, there~ ore, were not in any sense a public nuisance. But
notwithstanding these allegations, it was nevertheless within the option or discretion of the city
council to determine whether the welfare of the
city demandea the abatement of thes!e' structures;
and unless such discretion was exercised in an
arbitrary, dis·crimi~atory, and unreasonable man~er, or in such manner as to invade the constitutional rights of property, the court wi11 not interfere and declare the ordinance void. ·See North.
Little R·ock v. Rose, 136 Ark. 298, 206 S. W. 449,
and cases there cited.
I

"The complaint does not contain any allegations .which show that the ordinance is unreasonable, arbitrary, and discriminatory, or that it invades· appellants' constitutional right to own and
use their property. The fact that the· city council
prern~itted the operation of ·other. stations, known
as 'drive-in stations' which were not situated on
the street but. on private lo'ts, would not tend to
show that the ordinance under review was disSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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criminatory, even though, in order to reach these,
drive-in stations, it was necessary to drive across
the side,valks of the city, and even though the
fire hazard ''""as greater from such stations than
from the filling station of appetlants. Such 'drivein' stations being situated upon p-rivate lots, the¥
rannot be brought 'vithin ,the same class as the
filling station of the app.ellants, which is within
the bolmdaries of the street. Comparison cannot
be made between filling stations situated on private lots and filling stations situated within the
boundaries qf the street, in order to determine
whether the ordinance be discriminatory and unreasonable. The right of the city council to· pas:s
the ordinance under consideration is predicated
upon the fact that the fil1ing station of appellants
·is within the street of the city and therefore a
purpresture, which the council, by an ordinance
which is not arbitrary, discriminatory or unreasonable, ha.s the right to remove.''
It was further contended by appe1lant that the curb
pumps were placed in the parking with the ·consent of
the city and having exp·ended considerabl~e sums of money
in the construction of the same they, therefore~ had a
vested right to keep them there so long as they did not
become a menace to the life or s.afety of the public;
the court finding that app;ellant had no such right and
thereunder cited the ease of Keys:er vs. City of Bois;e,
165 P. 1121, an Idaho case, wherein the court said :

'' * * * The authorities dealing with the question raised by the demurrer are conflicting, but
we are of the opinion that the. sounder rule, and
the rule supported by the better reasoned cases,
is to the effect that the streets, from side to side
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and end to end, belong to the p·ublic, and ar.e held
by the municipality in trust for the use. of the
public. The city is t~erefore without authority, in
the absenQe of a legislative enactment expressly
p·ermitting it, to grant a private· person or corporation a permit to erect or maintain a permanent obstruction in a public stre·et or thoroughfare for a purely private purpose; we have no
such statute in this state. It fo1lows that any one
obtaining a permit from the city for the private
use of a pu·blic street, a;s in this cas.e, takes the
same with notice that it is subject to revocation
at the will of the city, and, indeed, in this view it
matters not whether the us.e is made in accordance
with a permit or without one, the· us·e is merely
permissive in either event, and revocable at any
· time without notice. If the p·erson making' such
private use oi a stre-et goes to expense, he does
so at his own risk, and he will not be heard to
complain that his prop·erty is· being taken without
due process of law.
"The holder of a permit to install an obstruction in a p:ublic street or thoroughfare, for a pri, vate purpos·e, acquires no property. or contractual
right by reason of the issuance to him of such
permit, and whenever the city authorities, their·
discretion, ·deem it necessary, as a proper police
measure to vacate ·and revoke such permit, the
holder ·of the· same has no alternative, but must
comply with the order of revocation.''

in

The court further stated that any p·ermissive use
of -the s treets and parkings would be with the full knowledge of thH statutory limitations on the p:arit of the officers of the city to grant same and that the:reforo no
property rights could he acquired from such use of. the
streets by plaintiff. .
1
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In the c.ase of Forbe·s v. City of Detroit, et. al., 102
740, a ~lichigan case, the plaintiff applied to the
City of Detroit for a permit to haVle the bay windo~f
of her building encroach into the street~, which permit
was granted subject to removal at any time when directed
by the coinn1on council. As soon as these· windows w-ere
··con1pleted at great expense the plaintiff receive·d a ten
days' notice informing her that her permit was terminated and she was to remove fu;ese encroachments. The
court said:

N.,,r.

•' The express terms of the license give th·e
right to the city to terminate it at will, ·and although it would have been better for Mrs. Forbes
had the counsel not granted it in the first place,
·thus preventing her from the los:s that she will
suffer by its revocation, that cannot deprive the
city of its reserved right, even if its power to
grant the privilege be unquestioned. The action
of the council is perhaps s.uhject to some criticism,
f.or the failure to fully understand and limit the
proposed improvement in the first instance; but
there is no indication of bad faith, ·and it was
commendable that action was taken as soon as the
misunderstanding developed, instead of permitt~ng more expense to be incurred. There is a manifest propriety in denying the privilege· of 'encroachment upon streets. While Mrs. Forbe-s is
a sufferer without apparent fault upon her part,
we see no way of relieving her.''
Rowe v. City of Cincinnati, an Ohio case reported
in 159 N.E. at page 365, is a case wherein the plaintiff
prayed for a restraining order ~against the def:endant city'
from enforcing the provisions ·r.eqniring the removal of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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gasoline pumps from between the sidewalk and th·e.curb.
The court said in pa:Vt that the use of the ·street for such
purpos·e is merely a pe·rmissive use. under a temporary
license which creates no vested right to use the street for
an exclusively privat·e business and may at any ti:rri!e· be
withdr~awn by the city. And further said an abutting
owner does not hav!e such right of prop;erty in the public
streets as to· give him the right to app~ropriate a portion
, of the street permanently to the purposes of his private
business. Any privilege which the plaintiff in error heretofore had or enjoyed by virtue of the pennit from the
city has no·w been revok~ed. That privilege at most constituted a mere licens-e or pennissive use. ·They therein
cite·d the case of City of New Orleans v. Kaufman, a
Louisiana cas·e, 70 ·so. 874, wherein the court said:
''City ordinance prohibiting the erection of
sheds, signs, etc., in Napoleon avenue held to he
valid~
''The public right to the use of the street goes
to the full width of the strHet, and extends indefinitely upward and downward,
''The municipal officers may temporarily
tolerate or p·ermit minor obstructions to the full
use of the streets which they deem not injurious
to the rights of the public, hut .such toleration
may be ended, or permission revoked, at any time
by the same or any succeeding council. ''
They also cite the case of Eddy v. Grange-r, City
TrHasurer, a Rhode Island
page 831, wherein

~the-

cas~e

r-eported in 31 Atl. at

court said: ''Permission from a
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1nunieipality to use a public street for a private drain
is a.t Inost a revocable license, and cannot create a vested
right to Ina.intain the drain.'' The court therein cites
several other cases which are very much in point with
our pr~sent case.
In the case of Chap·man v. City of Lincoln, a
Nebraska case reported in 121 N.W. 596, the plaintiff
sought a temporary injunction from the enforcement
of a city ordinance requiring- the removal of stands set
up on the city's sidewalks for the sale of fruits and
9ther merchandise. The cou·rt held the fact that defendant city in the past has been p·ermitting the:se violations of its ordinances and the statutes of the state, but
has now commenced the work of removing al'l obstructions and may well be construed. as evidence fro in th~
fact that it intends to prosecute the good work to a
final and p-roper conclusion. Nor is the city estopped by
reason of its failure to enforce the ordinances in the
past or by reason of its permission of such violation
from now insisting upon a strict observance of ils ordinances.
•

• .

•

.

.

I

•

In th·e case of Union Institution For Savings in City
of Boston v. City of Boston, a Mass·achusetts. case reported in 112 ~N.~. 637, wherein a t·emporary injunction
was requested from the enforcement of an order re-quiring the removal of a large street clock. which had been
installed Un.de·:r permit issued by the city, the court said
that the contention ''that the erection of the clock under
this p·ermit constituted a contract which cannot be imSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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paired, as well as a ve-ste·d prop·e·rty Ijght which cannot
be taken from the ·plaintiff ·except by the power of
eminent domain,'' necessarily assumes that the board
or agents of the commonwealth, ·by necessary implication is authorized by the statute ~to contract to give up
and s.urrender its and the eommonwealth's control of the
full use of public highways.. That such authority is not
implied as necessary to the proper exercise of the power
conferred is obvious. 3 McQuillan, Municipal Corp. Sec.
2844. The right gran:ted is not a franchise or a contract,
but is a licens·e which 1egaliz·es that form of obstruction
in a public highway which would otherwise constitute a
.
.
nuisance.

In the case of Mettler v. City of Ottumwa, an Iowa
case reported in 19'6 N.W. at page 1000, the cou~t said
permission granted to the owner of private property to
use a portion of the street for an areaway may be revoked at ~any time in the sound discretion of the council.
In the cas,e of Robinson v. City of Spokane, a Washington cas·e reported in 120 P. 101, the court held that
the abutting owner had no property inte-rest in the trees
Planted along the highway, saying, it seems clear that
whatever right the city may have here·tofore granted
to ab)l:tting owners to plant tre-es in :the street, such right
was a mere pennissive right or a license which might be
:r.evoked at any time and ~o vested rights could arise
therefrom. The city in its legislative capacity might
exercise this power to revoke the licens,e and cause the
#

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
removal of any obstruction in the s·treets without
bility.

In Utah I am unable to find any case that has

lia~

be·~n

decided exactly in point. However, in the case of Morris
v. Salt Lake City, reported in 101 P. 373, the court said:
•·Upon the n1erits of the appeal, it i'S insisted
by cotmse1 for the city: That it had the exclusive
right to establish street and sidewalk grades ; that
under the statute's ·of this state full power and
authority over streets is conferred upon cities,
with the right to grade, gutter, and improve them
as may seem proper to the city authorities ; that
the 'sidewalk in que-stion was planned and laid
strictly in accordance with, ~and pursuant to, the
powers conferred by the statute; and that, while
an abutting lot owner may plant trees in the street
in front of his premises, such trees are nevertheless subject to the control of the city, and if, in
the exercise of its lawful powers, when reasonably
exercised, it becomes necesary to remove or destroy any trees growing in the street, the city
may remove or destroy them.''
and
''While an abutting lot owner may therefore,
p~:ant trees in a str~et in front of his premis·es,
and may acquire an interest in them which· the· ·
law will protect as against any one who, without
lawful authority, injures them or destroys them,
yet, notwithatanding this, the lot owner plants th·e
tre·es in the street subject to the rights of the
public.''
Also the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in ~the
case of ·Salt Lake City v. Schuback, reporte-d in 159 Pac.
2d, 149, sets down the rule that cities may authorize
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limited use of the sidewalks for the benefit of adj-acent
property owners, hut :that the .same are at ail times
subje:ct to the right of control by the cities over the use
of said sidewalks..
Also in the case of Lewis v. Pingree National Bank,
a Utah case reported in 1'51 Pac. 558, the court held that
a private person had full power to abate any encroachtnent into a public street, ·howeveT t~e same being subj:~ct to modification by a court of equity. If this action
had been comtnenc·ed by the city rather than by an individual I feel the decision would have. required the re·moval of ~the encroachment herein referred to.

THE COURT CANNOT P AS·s UPON THE
WIS~DOM O·F THE CI'TY CO·M·~fiSSIONERS IN
MAKING AND ENTERING THEIR ORDER o·F REMOVAL OF S!GNS IN THE s~TREETS OF SALT
LAKE ·CITY.
· III.

Appellants contend in their argument that the city·
acted arbitr~arily and capriciously becaus·e its order of
removal was not supported by any reason, ~ogic, lawful
clas.sifieation or le-gitimate objective and set out more
spe~ciflcally u:nder sub-paragraphs (a), (h), (c), (d), (-e·),
(£), (g), (h), (i) and (j) of paragraph 11 of their compl~aint their reasons why the. city's order of removal
was disc·riminating and unlawful, and app·ellants further
contend that it is incumbent Upon the city to. S·et forth
its reasons ·or findings showing a public nece:s·sity for .the
use of the streets by the public before such order of removal can issue. ·
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.

'\

By ~ar the great 'veight of authority and riurnher
of cases hold that when the city is granted po"r.er to
exercise its discretion the presumption will be that the
city has not abused such discretion but has acted in good
faith for the benefit of the pub!lic. It is further held that
it is necessary to plead and prove a clear and palpable
abuse of such discretion on the part of the city to enjoin
any action taken by it.
Here the appellants allege nothing in their complaint
showing an abuse of discretion on the p·art of the city
but merely state that in appellants' opinion certain facts
which might require a removal of their signs were nonexisting at the date of the isuing of the order of removal
by the city. Clearly the courts cannot substitute theirs
or others opinions or judgment for that of the city'·s,
t
the proper and ordered procedur.e. b~ing for ap·p·el~ants
to convince the city commission in ~a reguJ.ar official meeting that the city had erre·d in the issuance of suc:h an
order.
A leading case sustaining this position is that of
Groover v. City of Irvine, a Kentucky case reporte·d in
?OO S.W. 904, in which case the plaintiff sought to enjoin the city from is-suing a franchis-e and alleged in his
petition that the Mayor of the city was interested: in the
company s·eekiilg the franchise; that he had procured
his brother to bid on said franchise and that the plaintiff's brother was outbid and that still the bid was given
to the Mayor's eompany. In ans.wer to s·aid peti~on the
court said:
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''In granting franchise& for the public benefit, a city council 'acts in a legislative ·capacity.
In the eX!ercise of this power a discretion is vested,
which cannot be taken away by the courts. * * •
However, 'vhen ~the exercis;e of ·the power and
discretion t~o reject bids is attacked in the courts,
the presumption will be mdulged that the council
has not abused its discretion, but has acted with
re:ason and in good rai~th for the benefit of the
p·ublic. To p~roceed upon any other theory would be
to substitute the judgment and discretion of the
courts for the judgm·ent of the members ·of the
council with whom the lawmakers have seen fit
to lodge th·e power. Little Rock Railway & El~c
tric Company v. Dowell, 101 Ark. 223, 142 S. W.
165, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 1086. Hence it is incumbent on one who calls in question the discretion
of th·e council to allege and prove facts showing
that the council acted arbitrarily or corruptly,
and was therefore guilty of a cl~ear and palpable
abuse of dis:cretion.
.

I

''He:ve the soie facts relied on by the. successful bidd~r. are that the hoard of council reje·cted all
bids., and that the Mayor, who was interested in
another tele.phone company having a franchise
in the city; used his influence and s~ecured th~
passage of an ordin~ance or resolution undertaking
to rep,eal the ordinance granting the franchise, and
to set aside the sale. It is not charged that the
mayor us.ed any imp!roper or corrupt influence
over the members of the eoul}.cil, or even that
their action was induced .solely by such influence
as he aiJtemp·ted to use. :Therefor~e· the case is. one
where, notWithstanding the allegations of the·
ple~~dings, the memhers of the council m~y have
acted with ~eason and in the utmost good faith.
That· being true, the faets p~eaded are not snfSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ficient to show a clear and p~alpable abuse of discretion on the part of the members of' the city
council. It follows that the plaintiff did not show
himself entitled to a mandatory injunction requiring the council to accept his bid, and that the
chancellor did not err in sustaining the demurrer
to the petition as amended.''
In the case of Ex Parte Stallcups, a Texas case
reported in 220 s.,\y. 547, the plaintiff contended that
the city acted arbitrarily and capriciously in eliminating
certain parking zones and the court said :
"Why the city council abrogated that particular stand is not shown, nor has it been shown that
it was without the power of the city ·council legitimately exercis·e. The creation of stands of this
characte·r and th·eir abolition is .'largely discretionary with the city council. What may operate
at one time to create the s~d may he not proper
at another time. T:Qe solution of these matters is
largely within th,e discretion of the city council,
and in order to show their unre·asonableness facts
must be adduced. In a general way it may be
stated that the authorities hold. that such ordinances are within the power of the city council, 'and
the· authority conferred upon that governing body
of the municipal corporation, and unless they violate the Constitution or the general law of· the
land as enacted by the Legislature, or are unreasonable and arbitrary, they wi'll be upheld.''
ln the case of Lacey v. City of Oskaloosa, an Iowa
case reported in 121 N.W. 542, the p 1laintiff sought to
restrain the city froin removing ce·rtain hitching

post~

from the city stre·ets. The court said:
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'' The f·ee · rti tle of the streets is in the town,
and no private person has any legal right to erect
any structure therein for the purpose of carrying on his private business, and if, having done
so, he is required to remov.e his building or structure, or whatever it may be, from the street, he
has no cause of complaint. He is deprived of no
right.''
The court further said :
''The limited extent of the obstruction is imrnaterial as affecting the right of the city to remove it. The fact that, notwithstanding the obstruction, there is still ample room left for passage
of' teams and travelers, 'fill not -exempt it from
liability to removal wheneve-r orde1~ed . by the
proper municipa1 authority.''
And the court further says:
''The powers granted to the town are l·egislative in character, and 'vithin the limits prescribed
by statute ar.e plenary. The only lllnit upon them
which the courts have been inclined to recognize
is that they s·hall not be exercis.ed unr;easonably .
. The wisdom of a legislative act is not a matte~r
for judicial consideration or review, nor will the
courts inquire into the necessity of a change or
improv-ement in a public street ordered in due
£orin by municip·al authority.''
In the case of Edabtirn v. City of Creston, an Iowa
cas.e reported in 202 N.W. 580, :the plaintiff sought to
~njoin the ·city from an order requiring the removal of
a gas filling station from the curbing of congested stre·ets,
wherein the court said:
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'~~City

councils are by s,tatute given contro~ of
the streets of n1unicipalities, a.nd it is their duty
to In-aintain and keep then1 free from obstructions
and nuisances. This court cannot pass up'On the
'Yisdom, or lack thereof, on the parrt of the· city
council of Creston in the enactment of the ordinance in question, nor do 've perceive any theory
upon which its enforcement can be properly enjoined upon the record before us.''

In the case of n,rorris v. Salt Lake City, reported in
101 Pac. 373, the court said:

''The courts may not control the city in the
exe·rcise of i1ts rights in making public improvements, nor can the courts _9rdinarily review the
actions of the city authorities in their determination of what the improvement shall be and how
its plans shall be executed. ' ' ·
And further:
''As a general statement therefore it may
be said that the law authorizers the- city authorities
to exercise their own judgment in establishing
streets or sidewalk grades and· in . formulating
p'lans for improvements of thwt or any other public
character.... It· is also clear that the execution
of the plans adopted may not be arrested or the
plans reviewed by either a court ·or jury, unless it
is mad~ to appear th8Jt they were conceived in bad
faith, or that they are oppressive or clearly unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. ''
In the case of Broadbent V. Gibson, a Utah case
reported in 140 Pac. 2d 943, th·e court said:
' 'A court is not concern.ed with the wisdom
or policy of t:he law and cannot substltute its
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judgment for that of the le-gislative body. If
reasonable minds might differ as to the reasonableness of the regulation, the law must be uphe~·d.''

IV. PROPER NOTICE OF THE O·RDER OF
REM·OVAL WAS GIVEN T·O E·ACH APPELLANT.
The appellants did not urg.e the first point of their
argument to any great extent and rightfully so, for in
paragraph 6 of app·ellants' brief they allege as follows:
.
' ' 6. Twice during the year 1947 officials of
the defendant notified groups of the plaintiffs
that signs on ·parking or curb areas of the ·streets
of defendant city should he. removed and that permits for a continued use of said signs would not
be removed. ' '

And again in p·aragraph 12 they allege :

.

' '12.. This action is brought in behalf ·of all
persons situated similarly to plaintiffs or any of
.· them, which p~ersons may join as plaintiffs in this
cause or have the benefit of this proceeding without joining.''
And further, in paragraph ~4 they a~lege:

',' 14. · D~efendant has given notice to plaintiffs and to all- of them that their: existing signs
muSit be removed on or hefore F~~.bruary 15, 1948,
and that unless (s'o removed the defendant will take
action against each ·plaintiff .for ·removal of said
sign·s. ''
Certainly based upon the above allegations containHd in ,app·ellants' complaint, app·ellants cannot now
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be held to con1plain that they were not given prop·er
notice of the city's order of removal.

';· THE ORDER OF REMOVAL O:F ·SIGN·S
WAS GIVEN TO EACH HO·LDER OF A PERMIT
OR LICENSE SI~1ILARL Y SITUATED OR L:OC1\.TED IN SALT LAKE CITY.
The appellants furt;her contend that they are being
discriminated against because owners of signs affixed
to buildings which project over the public sidewalks and
owners of areaways located under pub~ic sidewalks were
not ordered to remove 'Such signs or ·encroachmen~s by
the city.
Paragraph 4 of appellants' complaint alleges as follows:
'' 4. Each of the plaintiffs is the owner :of a
sign or -signs_ advertising the busines's of such
plaintiff and inviting patronage of said business
from members of the publi-c who travel upon and
use the streets 'Of ~S·alt ake ·City, and each of said
signs is situated upon that portion of the public
streets known ~as the curbing or parking area lying
and being between the curb or edge of the portion
of the street us·ed for vehicular traffic and the
sidewalk or the portion used fror pedestrian traffic,
and each of said 'signs is mounted upon a support
whjch is affixed to or re-sts upon said portion of
the public street. None of said signs protrudes
over or is above ·any portion of any p~ublic street
· which is customarily us-ed by pedestrians for
walking, by vehicular traffic for travel or movement, or by any other group of persons except
1
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these plaintiffs, who car1e -for the lawn, flowers,
shrubs., and trees in said parking areas and service
said signs: as and when service is needed.''
And paragraph 12 of said complaint alleges :
'' 12. This action is brought in behalf of all
persons situated similarly to plaintiffs or any of
them, which p·ersons may join a:s plaintiffs in this
cause or have the benefit of this proceeding wi,thout joining.''
From the said allegations of appellants' compl,aint
the trial court must take as an estab1ished fact that all
owners of the particular type and location of signs
ordered removed by th~~ city are parties to this action
and that said order of removal is not being enforced
· only against a port~on of the group, of such owners similarly located, as inferred by appellants in their brief.
The law is well established that an order or an ordinance which op~erates uniformly against all those similarly located o-r to a particular class are valid ·and sho:nld
be· upheld.
The owners of areaways are in a different class than
owners of signs, and owners of projection signs located
over public sidewalks arH in a different class than owners . of signs established on s~dards affixed to the
ground ·and located between the :sidewalk and curb lines.
P~e.rhaps

a future city commission would in their
sound discretion prefer to ·eliminate :the p~rojection signs
and p-ermit the establishm~ent of curb signs but as· has
been heretofore discussed, such discretion is not to be
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interfered with or substituted by the discretion of others
or of courts.
The Utah Legislature created a disti~ction in the
curb signs and otl1er structures located over the side'valks and therefore placed them in different c'lasses, as
is shown by the wording of Sections 15-8-23 and 15-8-26.
In the case of Mettler v. City of .Ottumwa, an Iowa
case reported in 196 N.W. on page 1000, the court permitted evidence to be introduced to prove. that the city
council acted arbitrarily when it ordered ap:p,ellant ''to
remove the areaway and clos_e the opening, and! that discrimination in favor of the owners· of other buildings
similarly situated and used is shown by the _neglect and
failure of the officers to order -areaways used in connection therewi~h to be removed. Of course, such action
of the city council, if shown, would be intolerable. The
weight of the eVidence, however, t~nds to s·how that
many areaway;s have already been closed in the business
district, and that the city council is proceeding, cautiously in the matter, hut requiring each owner to remove
the obstruction whenever the public exigencies demand
the space occupied thereby. The ordinance is not_ in its
terms discriminatory, but provides for, ·and contemplates,
uniformity of -operation.''
In the case of ·City of Pierce v. Schramm, a Nebraska
case reported- in 216 N.W. 809', the court found against
the city who made an order :vequiring one owner to
remove his gasoline pumps from the curb and therein
said:
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''·Here those similarly situated are not e-ven
Inade parties to the suit ·and the defendant is arbitrarily selected out of the group of those similarly situated, and that without any intention on the
part of the. city of in any manner molesting the
o:thers, the indication being that had the city proceeded against all those simiiarly located, the
action would have been upheld.''
In the case of Broadbent v. Gibson, supra, the
c.ourt said :
''In determining w hetb:er or not this classification is unconstitutional, it must he remembered that discrimination is the very essence of
clas'sification and· is not objectionable unless
founded upon distinctions which the court is compelled to find unreasonable. 'The legislature has a
wide discretion in determining what shall come
within the·clas~s of pe:rmitted activities _and what
shal'l be excluded. ''

VI. UNDER CITY'S 'DELEGATED· POWERS
IT IS NO'T REQUIRED THAT S;ECTION 5720 OF
THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SAL~T LAKE
CITY, UTAH, 1944, CONTAIN STANDARDS OR
RULES TO GUIDE ·THE COMMISSIONERS! OF
SALT LAKE CITY O~R PUBLIC IN THE MATTER
OF THE REMOVAL OF LICENSED· SIGNS .
. The four~h and last ·point argued by appellants in
their brief contends th~t Section 5720 of the Revised
Ordinances of ~alt Lake City, Utah, 1944, is void bec-ause
~t does not contain standards or rules to guide the city
commission· or public in the removal of licensed signs
and in sup~port thereof cite certain cas~e·s.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~7

'·The generally accepted rule· i'S. to the effect
that a statute or ordinance whieh vests arbitrary
discretion 'vith respect to an ordinarily lawful
business. profession, appliance, etc., in public officials, 'vithout prescribing a uniform rule of
action, or, in other words, which authorizes the
issuing or withholding of licenses, permits, approvals, -etc., according as the designated officials
arbitrarily choose, without reference to all of the
dlas·s to which the statute or ordinance under consideration was intended to apply~ and without
being controlled or guide·d by any definite rule or
specified conditions to which all similarly situated might kno-\vingly conform,- is uncons~ti~
tional and void."
T·here are, however, very definite exemptions 'to this
general rule, one being to the ·effect that it is not always
necessary that stah1tes and ordinances prescribe a specific rule of action, but, on the other hand, some. situations requiring th·e vesting of some discretion in pub~ic
officials, a.s, for 'instance, where it is; difficult or impracticable to lay down a definite, comprehensive rule, or the
discretion relates to ihe administration of a police regulation and is necessary -to protect the public morals,
health, safety and ge·neral.welfare.
.

I

Another exception is wh~r-e mere· matters involving
an exercise of discretion as to details in enforcing otherwise valid ordinances may be left to designated officiais.
.

I

I

And still another exception is where the discretion
is with respect to matters of m·ere privilege as where
the discretion relates to a business, the carrying on of
'vhich i~ a mere matter of privilege because of a character
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tending to 'be injurious ·rather than ail ordinary lawful
business, the carrying on of which croeates a properly
right or vested interest. Arbitrary ·discretion as to. the
granting of licenses or revoking of licens·es may lawfully
be delegated to public officials without prescribing definite ru1·es of action.
Section 5720 of the R.evised Ordinances. of Salt Lake
City, Utah, 1944, definitely com·es under two of these
exceptions to the general rule; the first beirig that of an
'
exercise of police power
in the enforcement of said
ordinances, as has heen more sp·ecifically referred to
in the case of Palace Garage v. Oklahoma City, supra;
and also that exception allowing dis·cretion with respect
to a matter of mere privile·ge, for no one i:u the city of
Salt Lake Crty has the absolute right to install cr maintain signs in the pub1ic streets of Salt Lake City.
Section 15-8-26 delegates to cities in Utah the right
to regulate or prevent the use· o.f. its streets for sign
posts and therefor,e definitely the city has th·e right of
discretion with r~sp~ect to· the matter· of granting or
revoking a permit for such use of its stre·ets.
In 92 A.L.R. at page 410 it is said:
"As an exception or qualification to the· rule
stated, it has been held that it is not always
necessary that statutes and ordinances prescribe
a sp,ecial rule of action, hut, on the other hand,
some situations require the ve'S'ting of some dis~retion, in public offici·a1s, as, for instance, where
it is difficult or imprac,ticab1e. to lay down a defSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

29
inite comprehensive rule, or the disel"etion ·relates
to the administration of a police regulation and
is neces·sary _to protect the public morals, health,
safety, and general welfaro. It n1ay be n·oted that
the modern tendency is to be more liberal in pet:
mitting grants of discretion to administrative
bodies or officers in order to facilitate the administration of laws as the complexity of economic
and governmental condition increases. ''
In the case of State v. Cohen, a Ne'v Hampshire
case reported in 63 ~;\_tl. 928, the court. held:
'· . .\ statute au·thorizing city officials to license
persons 'deemed by then1 to be suitable' to he
junk dealers, and to detepnine and designate the
places where the licensees were to carry on their
business, was held constitutional as again·st the
objection that it granted arbitrary power, on :th·e
theory that the junk business endangers the public morals, safety, and welfare, and that in such
a c.ase a reasonable discretion may 'be vested in
public officials. With respect to the provision relating to· determination of the place of busin·ess,
the court said that the same was nec-essary for
the protection of the public against the dangers
of the spread of contagious diseases and of conflagration, etc. And upon the question of suitableness of :applicants, see the case as treated.''
And in the case of Racine v. District Ct., a Rhode
Island case reported in 98 Atl. 97, the court said:
''An ordinance authorizing the city clerk,
upon the app·roval of the chief of p·o'lice, to grant
motorbus licenses to individuals, firms, and corporations deeme·d suitable to conduct such bus,
was upheld as against the contention that it left
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everything tto the unbridled imagination, caprice,
discretion, or fancy of the city clerk ·and the chief
of. police,' ,fue court proceeding upon the theory
that it will be assumed that there will be no abus·e
of diseretion, and that the uncontrolled discretion
arose from the fact it was difficult to define in
advan0e upon what conditions the permits should
be gran ted.''
In .Crumpton v. Niontgoinery, an ..c\labama case reported in 59 So. 294, the court said:
''That the selection of the beneficiaries of a
n1ere privilege, not involving a· matter of right,
may he co~itted to the· <ijscretion of a body created for that purpose, and so without impinging
upon any vested right of one who desired to enjoy the privilege, or from whom it .was, in the
discretion of the body, withdrawn.''
~
In the· case of Newbern v. McCanri, a Tenness~ee
cas.e reported· in 58 S.W. 114, the court held that where
the business is a matter of p~vilege and not a matter of
right and is subject to police regulation, a much larger
discretion should he given in order to p~rotect the welfare
of the people. It has been held that a statute authorizing
township boards to 1icens-e billiard and pool halls:~ whenever in the judgment of ·the board it shall be to the best
interests of .the township, to grant the s:ame, is not unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ~ arbitrary and
uncontrolled dis-cretion to such township~ boards.
In the cas·e of Contract Cartage Co. v. Morris, a
Wash.ington D.C. cas.e reported in 59 Fed. 2d 437, which
cas-e involved ''a statute limiting the weight and dimenSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sions of vehicles on the state highways, and empow·ering
highway officials to grant special permits for limited
periods for tl1e operation of vehicles exceeding the limitations set by the statute 'vhen in ·their opinion a sufficient en1ergency should exist. It was held that leaving
the determination of the existence of an emergency to
officia1 judgment without definition did not amount to
an invalid delegation of legislative power, the court saying: 'Tl1e word 'emergency' is.used in its plain, ordinary
signification, and, as defined by the lexi~ographers, me·ans
or implies a pressing necessity; an unforeseen <?Ccurrence or combination of circumstances which calls for
immediate action or remedy'.' 7
And in the case of Winter v. Barrett, an lllinois
case reported in 186 N.E. 113, the co~ said:
''In enacting laws the legislature cann·ot deal
with the _details of every particular cas,e, and
reasonable discretion as to the manner of' ·executing a law must necessarily be given to administrative officers. Such officers, in the performance
of their duties, are frequently called ~upon to
exercis,e judgment and discretion, to invesltigate
and decide, and yet in doing so they do not exercise judicial power. within the meaning of the
Constitution.''
In the case of Thompson v. Smith, a Virginia case
reported 154 S.E. 579, the court said:
' 'Mere matters of detail within the policy and
the legal.princip'les and sitandards ,established by
th~ statute or ordinance may properly be left to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

32
administrative discretion; for· the determination
of such matters of detail is more ·ess.entially ministerial than legislative. In declaring the policy
of the law and fixing the legal principle-s and
standards which are to control in the administra. tion of the law, genera1 terms which get precision
from the te-chnical knowledge or sense and 'experience of men and thereby becom·e reasonably certain may be used; and an administrative officer
or bureau may be inv.ested V\rith the power to ascertain and determine whether the qualifications,
facts, or conditions comprehended in and required
by such ge'neral terms ·exist, and whether the
provisions of the law so fixed and declared have
been complied with in accordance with the gener·
. ally accepted meaning of the words.''
1

And in the ease of Southern R. Co. V. Com .. a Virginia case r'eported in 167 S.E. 578, it is stated:

''A statute authorizing the statJe highway
commissioner to require railroads in the state to
build overhead crossings when in his opinion 'such
would be necessary for public safety or conveni~ence W8JS held not to be a delegation of 'legislativ:e
powers .. The court stated that, whil·e the legislature is ·the source from which legislation must
come, if a statute sufficiently indicates legisla.tive purpose, and has merrely left administrative
details to some agent, it is not invalid, the court
further remarking that a legislature does not ·sit
continu·ously, and must necessarily work with and
through som,e such instrumentality.''
And in the ease of State ex r~l. v. Milwaukee, a
Wis.consin case reported in 240 N.W. 847, it was held:
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·"That in so ·far as an ordinance authorized
revocation of licenses by the mayor 'whenever he
shall consider it necessary or expedient for the
good order of the city so to do,' the city council
had left to the mayor only the administrative
function of ascertaining the existence of facts because of which revocation is necessary or expedient for such good order, ·and that the delegation of the power of revocation was not void as
failing' to fix a standard for th~e mayor's action
and thereby amounting to an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative powers -to a quasi judicial
officer. In this case, the mayor had revoked a
license issued under the ord;inance in question
pennitting the conduction of a Marathon dance.''
In the case of Ex Parte Graham, a California case
reported in 269 Pac. 183, the court h·eld that a delegation
of power to municipa1 boards or officers to _grant and
refuse permits to engage in occupations and businesses,
which are proper subject of police surveillance- and regu~
lation, will be sustained, though involving discretion, on

theory that such officers will not use powers· villianously
or for purpose of oppression or mischief.

Utah apparently follows the exception to the general rule in matters with respect :to discretion of me-re
privi~ege,

for in the case of Eureka City v. Wilson, 15
Utah 53, 48 Pac. 41, and affirme'd by· the United State-s
Supreme Court in 173 U.S. 3'2, 43 L.

~d.

603, the court

held that the moving of buildings. on public streets has
been held to be a special privilege which can be arbitrarily controlled so that a municipality• can by ordinance
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make the granting of pennits rest upon the discretion
of a public official without prescribing a rule of action.
Also s·ee the case of Kenyon Hotel ·co. v. Oregon
Short I_Jine, a Utah case reported in 220 Pac. at page
382.
C·ON·CLUSION

The order of the trial court in sustaining the general demurrer and its further order dismissing the complaint of appellants for their failure and refusal to amend
said complaint, or otherwise plead, should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,

E. R. CIIRISTENSEN,
City Attorney

HOMER HOL·MGREN,
A. PRAT·T KE'SLER,
Assistant City Attorneys.
A ttO,'f"'l'leYS ftorr Respo'flilent.
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